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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
DANNY LEE JOHNSON, : Case No. 870096 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Case and 
Statement of Facts are set forth in Appellant's opening Brief at 
xi, 1-9. Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to portions of 
the Respondent's Brief. The points to which Appellant does not 
reply were adequately covered in his opening brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There was insufficient evidence to establish that 
Mr. Johnson intended to cause the death of Trooper Bringhurst. 
Theft is not a crime of dishonesty or false statement 
within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2), and the trial court therefore 
erred in refusing to suppress Mr. Johnson's misdemeanor theft 
convictions. 
The trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting 
the bloody clothing of Trooper Bringhurst. The clothing had little 
or no probative value which was substantially outweighed by the 
prejudicial effect of the bloody clothing. 
The trial court erred in admitting positive evidence of 
the trooper's character where the defense did not attack the 
trooper's character for truthfulness. 
Attempted homicide is not a triggering offense under the 
habitual criminal statute. The attempt merely classifies the 
offense, and the court must look to the underlying substantive 
offense in determining whether the legislature intended to exempt 
attempted murder. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED FIRST DEGREE MURDER. 
As the State noted in its brief at 20, in State v. 
Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), this Court stated: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted. 
Mr. Johnson contends that the testimony of Trooper Bringhurst, when 
read in conjunction with the physical evidence and the testimony of 
Officer Evans, was so inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that Mr. Johnson committed 
the crime for which he was charged. 
In its brief, the State characterizes the initial actions 
of Mr. Johnson as "almost inviting the patrolman to stop him." 
Respondent's Brief at 21. Contrary to counsel's depiction of the 
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actions as an invitation, Trooper Bringhurst's testimony was that 
the driving pattern coupled with the affirmation by the driver that 
he had been drinking suggested that the driver of the vehicle was 
drunk (T. 70-71). The physical evidence showing a .203 blood 
alcohol level confirmed the trooper's belief (T. 568). Furthermore, 
by the State's reasoning, Mr. Johnson was in a no-win situation in 
answering the trooper's question. An honest affirmative response is 
characterized as an attempt to lure the officer; counsel may well 
have characterized a negative response as an attempt to delay the 
stop and lure the trooper to a more secluded spot further from the 
city. 
Finally, although the State contends Mr. Johnson lured 
the trooper to the Paxton Avenue location (Respondent's Brief at 
21), the trooper was explicit about the number of lights in the area 
and the fact that it was well lit (T. 73-4). 
As Mr. Johnson outlined in his opening Brief, the 
critical seconds in this case began when the trooper approached 
Mr. Johnson's car and ended after the trooper fired his last shot. 
Of utmost importance in determining what occurred during this time 
frame is the testimony of Officer Evans, who heard all six shots 
fired and arrived on the scene and was able to see the trooper after 
three shots had been fired. Officer Evans, although much closer to 
the scene than the other officers who testified they heard a "boom" 
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then five "pops" was unable to distinguish between the shots1 
(T. 253). Furthermore, Officer Evans testified that Trooper 
Bringhurst was still standing when he arrived and was able to view 
the scene and only went down after the third shot (T. 254-5). The 
testimony of Richard Bergan, a weapon's expert, established that the 
impact of the shot gun blast would have knocked the trooper to the 
ground (T. 447, 438-9, 445-6). This information coupled with 
Officer Evans' observations suggests that the shot gun blast was the 
shot fired right before the trooper went down, or the third shot in 
the six-shot sequence. 
The State speculates that "after he threw himself 
backward to avoid the blast, Trooper Bringhurst attempted to get to 
his feet but because he was unsteady, he fell to the ground. 
Officer Evans saw him on his feet as he was falling to the ground in 
one motion." Respondent's Brief at 24. Such speculation is not 
based on anything in the record (see T. 224-5) and Trooper 
Bringhurst did not testify that he attempted to get back up. 
Furthermore, the rapid sequence of firing did not allow time for 
such a scenario. 
The State concedes that the door of the vehicle was "open 
for at least three of the five shots." Respondents Brief at 23. 
The State claims that the trooper "was unable to see whether the 
door was open or closed" and "did not know that the door had been 
opened." Resondent's Brief at 22. The trooper's exact testimony 
1
 Sgt. Vaughn testified that he and Sgt. Ferrin may have 
been talking when the first shot was fired (T. 296). 
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regarding whether the door was opened is as follows: 
Q. During this time that you have just described 
that the shots were fired, could you see 
whether the defendant had his car door open at 
any time? 
A. He didn't have the car door open. As I 
approached, it was not even cracked, and when 
I fired my last shot, the car door was not 
opened. 
(R. 1435). The trooper exhibited no hesitation in testifying that 
the door was not open. The State's attempt to label Appellant's 
statement that Trooper Bringhurst testified that "the door was 
closed throughout the incident" as a misstatement of the facts 
(Respondent's Brief at 23) and further attempt to construe the 
trooper's testimony as being that he did not know whether the door 
was open does not change the unequivocal statement of the trooper 
that the door was not open during the incident, that it was not open 
at the beginning of the shooting nor several seconds later when the 
shooting stopped. 
The position of the door and the trooper's perception of 
it is important since, as the State acknowledges, the door had to be 
open for the bullets to have ended up where they were found. Yet 
only Mr. Johnson testified to the open door; the trooper's inability 
to perceive the position of the door casts serious question on his 
ability to perceive the other incidents which occurred during those 
few seconds. 
As set forth further in Appellant's opening Brief, the 
testimony of Trooper Bringhurst was so inherently improbable that 
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reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Johnson intended to kill the trooper. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS 
MR. JOHNSON'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS. 
In its brief, the State acknowledges that "the majority 
of federal courts have ruled that theft is not a crime of 
dishonesty." Respondent's Brief at 38. In State v. Wight, 
No. 870558-CA, slip op. (Utah App. December 1, 1988), the Utah Court 
of Appeals echoed the majority view, stating ". . .we agree with 
[United States v.] Lipscomb[,702 F.2d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1983)] that 
the crime of robbery is not necessarily one of dishonesty or false 
statement for purpose of 609(a)(2) admissibility." Ij3. at 9. The 
Wight court pointed out, however, that "under 609(a)(2) inquiry may 
be made, at the court's discretion, regarding the particular facts 
to determine if honesty was a factor." _Id. In Wight, where the 
trial court made no such inquiry, the Court of Appeals held that the 
robbery conviction was inadmissible under Rule 609(a)(2). 
The State relies on the decision of the Washington 
Supreme Court in State v. Brown, 43 Crim. Law Rep. (BNA) 2315 (Wash. 
July 14, 1988) for support of its argument that theft is not a crime 
of dishonesty within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2). However, the 
Washington court expressly pointed out that it was rejecting federal 
interpretation of the rule. It stated: 
Rather than concentrating on federal 
interpretation of the federal rule, we will 
examine the meaning of ER 609(a)(2) without using 
federal case law and federal legislative history 
as a starting point. 
- 6 -
Unlike the Washington court, this Court has expressed an 
intention to seek uniformity between federal and Utah State rules of 
evidence by looking to the federal rules and decisions interpreting 
them for guidance. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333-4 (Utah 
1986) (citing State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 1986)); 
Preliminary Note, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). 
Furthermore, the Brown court acknowledged that the 
majority federal position is that theft crimes are not crimes of 
dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2). 
State v. Burton, 676 P.2d 975, 981 (Wash. 1984). 
Mr. Johnson urges that this Court follow the majority and 
"better reasoned" decisions under Rule 609(a)(2) (State v. 
Morehouse, 748 P.2d 187 (Utah App. 1988) (Jackson, J., dissenting at 
222 n.2) and find that theft crimes are not crimes of dishonesty or 
false statement within the meaning of that rule. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE 
BLOODY CLOTHING OF TROOPER BRINGHURST. 
The State contends that the bloody clothing was necessary 
to establish that Mr. Johnson was aware that Trooper Bringhurst was 
a law enforcement officer at the time of the incident and that the 
shirt therefore was relevant. Respondent's Brief at 45. Although 
counsel speculates that a possible defense in the instant case was 
"that defendant did not know Bringhurst was a law enforcement 
officer" (Respondent's Brief at 45), such a defense could easily 
have been countered by the testimony of Trooper Bringhurst that he 
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was in a uniform in a marked police car (T. 56-57f 73) or the 
testimony of other officers that the trooper was in uniform 
(T. 224-5, 294-5). Furthermore, counsel's speculation is 
ill-founded since that was not a defense raised in this case and 
nothing about the case suggested it might be.2 Because the evidence 
was cumulative of the extensive testimony establishing that Trooper 
Bringhurst was in uniform, and for the reasons outlined in 
Appellant's opening brief at 33, it had minimal probative value. 
The State further contends that "as compared to the 
gruesome photographs of victim's bodies [sic], a shirt with dried 
blood stains on the shoulder is not likely to incite passion or 
inflame the emotions of a jury." Respondent's Brief at 46. On the 
contrary, while gruesome photographs carry their own potential to 
inflame a jury, a bloody shirt is more tactile and the reality of 
the crime and its impact on the victim is more jarring and not as 
removed as is the case with a photograph. Opening an old grocery 
bag which contains a uniform shirt covered with dried blood and 
examining that shirt raises the same or greater revulsion and 
sympathy for the victim in jurors as examining a gruesome 
photograph. The prejudicial effect evinced by that revulsion and 
sympathy and the concomitant concern for the trooper far outweighed 
any minimal probative value of the evidence. 
2
 Had such a defense been raised, the State would have 
had an opportunity to counter it in rebuttal. 
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VII. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN ALLOWING POSITIVE EVIDENCE OF TROOPER 
BRINGHURST'S CHARACTER FOR TRUTHFULNESS, 
In its brief at 62, Respondent states: 
If Trooper Bringhurst truly could not recall what 
occurred, he would consequently be a witness who 
was not credible. Some statements, while taken 
out of context, were definitely inconsistent. His 
character for truthfulness had been attacked and, 
therefore, his credibility had been attacked 
within the meaning of the rule. 
Such circular reasoning by the State does change the fact that the 
defense did not attack Trooper Bringhurst's character for 
truthfulness; instead, it challenged his ability to recall the 
details of the incident and, hence, the reliability of his testimony. 
Credibility is comprised of two aspects: (a) the 
reliability of the testimony based on the witness1 ability to 
perceive and recall the incident and (b) the witness1 truthfulness. 
A completely honest person, where there is no question as to his 
character for truthfulness, can nevertheless deliver testimony that 
is not credible because he did not have the opportunity to see the 
event or cannot remember the details. In almost every criminal 
case, an "attack" is made on the witness1 ability to perceive and 
recall details, either through cross-examination or the use of prior 
inconsistent statements by the witness. 
The second aspect of credibility, the witness1 character 
for truthfulness, is not attacked as often in criminal cases. 
However, in cases where the witness is known to lie or is caught in 
an untruth, a challenge to the witness1 truthfulness is made. In 
its brief, the State blurs the distinction between the two aspects 
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of credibility and argues that where an attack is made on the 
reliability of the testimony, the truthfulness of a witness is 
automatically attacked, thereby allowing for positive evidence of 
truthfulness under Rule 608(a)(2). However, under 608(a)(2), the 
rule-making body expressly clarified that "the character of the 
witness for truthfulness" must be attacked, not that the credibility 
in general of the witness must be attacked, before evidence of 
truthful character is admissible. 
As the Appellant attempted to point out in his opening 
brief, the use of prior inconsistent statements in the instant case, 
while an attempt to show that Bringhurst had difficulty remembering 
details of the incidents and the details of his testimony were 
therefore not reliable, did not attack Bringhurst's character for 
truthfulness. See Appellant's opening brief at 56-7. 
While it is true that "[a] basic rule of evidence 
provides that prior inconsistent statements may be used to impeach 
the credibility of a witness" [see Respondent's Brief at 63, 
3eard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 503 (7th Cir. 1979), citing United 
States v. Hall, 422 U.S. 171 (1975)], prior inconsistent statements 
do not necessarily attack the character of a witness for 
truthfulness. in the instant case, the trooper's character for 
truthfulness was not attacked by the defendant's use of his prior 
statement; rather, the trooper's ability to perceive and recall were 
challenged, as is the case in almost every criminal trial. Allowing 
evidence of the trooper's character for truthfulness, where such 
character was not attacked by the defense, improperly bolstered the 
- 10 -
State's case, resulting in prejudice to Mr. Johnson. 
IX. ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE IS NOT A TRIGGERING 
OFFENSE UNDER THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE. 
In order to convict a defendant of "Attempted Criminal 
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree," the State must establish that 
the defendant violated Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202 (1953 as amended), 
the first degree murder statute and the attempt provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-3-203 (1953 as amended). In charging Mr. Johnson in 
the instant case, the State outlined Count I in the Information as 
follows: 
ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE FIRST 
DEGREE, a First Degree Felony, at 300 West Paxton 
Avenue, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or 
about May 27, 1986, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Section 202(k), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, in that the defendant, DANNY LEE 
JOHNSON, a party to the offense, intentionally or 
knowingly attempted to cause the death of Dennis 
Bringhurst and that at the time of the attempted 
homicide the victim was or had been a peace 
officer or law enforcement officer, and he was 
either on duty or the homicide was based on, 
caused by, or was related to that official 
position and the act or knew or reasonably should 
have known that the victim held or had had 
facsimile of a firearm or the representation of a 
firearm was used in the commission or furtherance 
Of the ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, as provided by 
Section 76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
In its Information, the State focused on the murder statute, 
classifying it at the end as an attempt rather than a successful 
murder. However, a review of the Information and the elements 
necessary for proof establish that the "offense" charged in this 
case is Murder. 
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The State points out that the legislative history of the 
statute is unclear as to why the language exempting Murder in the 
first or second degree was included in the statute in 1896 or 
retained when the statute was revised in 1953 and reenacted in 
1975. Respondent's Brief at 77. Although counsel attempts to 
delete and limit the statute by asserting that it serves no purpose 
(Respondent's Brief at 77), the language has repeatedly been 
included, even in modern times. 
3ecause the underlying offense for which Mr. Johnson was 
charged is Murder, the trial court erred in allowing that underlying 
offense, as qualified by the attempt classification, to operate as a 
triggering offense under the Habitual Criminal statute. The 
conviction for Being an Habitual Criminal should therefore be 
reversed and the case remanded for dismissal of that charge. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction and remand this case for a new trial or dismissal of 
the charges. 
Respectfully submitted this day of December, 1988. 
X J. REMAL / / 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
^M-e.cdaU 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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